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Information systems are  used  in  overt  and covert  conflict  and  information operations   target an opponent’s  
ability to manage information in support of operations for political, commercial and military advantage. System  
level attacks are complicated by logistic problems that require resources, command and control. Node level  









The creation  of  armed services  comprising  millions  of  combatants  and  auxiliaries   required  organisation  of 
labour   and  materiel  with   corresponding   levels   of  management.  With   conflicting   requirements   and   limited 
resources, efficient allocation is important. For example, operations research (OR) is ‘the science of planning  


























Other   models   restate   the   basic   Shannon   relationship   in   various   ways.   Lasswell,   speaking   of   Mass 
Communication,   in  1948   stated   ‘A convenient  way   to  describe  an  act  of   communication   is   to  answer   the  
following questions: Who? Says What?  In Which Channel?  To Whom? With What Effect?’. This was extended 
by Braddock who interposes “Under What Circumstances? For What purpose?”.  (McQuail and Windahl, 1981, 
pp.10­11)      The  De  Fleur  model   includes   both   transmission   and   reception   ‘Shannon’   channels,   addresses 
feedback and shows that noise is applied to all system components. (McQuail and Windahl, 1981, p.13)
Shannon Lasswell - Braddock
- For what purpose?
Under what circumstances?
Sender Who?
Message Says what? 
Channel In which channel? 
Noise -
Receiver To whom?  


























CLASSIFYING ATTACKS ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Information   security   is   primarily   concerned   on   how   to   prevent  or  detect  misconduct   in   information­based 






Interruption   (Figure   4b)   attacks   availability   when   a   system   asset   is   destroyed,   unavailable   or   unusable. 












Name Sender I Effect Receiver
I0 Normal 100% 0% 100%
I1 Interception 100% <=100% 100%
I2 Modification 100% >0% <100%
I3 Fabrication 0% 100% 100%
























benefit   (bits   transferred)   against   cost   (clock   cycles   required)  where  message   size   is   affected   by   hardware 




by cost.  Given that difficulty may exist  in determining benefit,  estimates based on appropriate heuristics or 
operational statistics may be used.
In   project  management,   the  PERT method  assesses   activity  duration  by  averaging  normal,   best   and  worst 
estimates.  Jordan and Machefsky suggest   ‘The  time estimate derived  from a PERT chart   tends  to be more  






Low Efficiency High Efficiency
High Feasibility Average Good
Low Feasibility Poor Average
Figure 6 Estimation Table









The aggregation functions selected may depend on the quality of the estimates.  For example, numeric estimates 
based on operational experience may be mathematically treated, while ‘belief functions allow us to base degrees 
of belief for one question on probabilities for a related question.’  (Shafer, 2000, p. 1)     Alternately, arithmetic 














MODE Overt/Covert Attack visibility
MEANS Hardware/Software/People Attack agent(s) 
Sender
ORIGIN Intrinsic/Extrinsic Is it part of the targeted system?
PATH Internal/External Is it applied internally or externally?
Path
DESTINATION Hardware/Software/People Targeted component
EFFECT Overt/Covert Result visibility
Receiver
Figure 7 IW Activity Classification







though research to date  indicates  little   in general access on successful  or  implemented chipping operations. 
However, ‘chipping’ can be seen as an extension of traditional sabotage techniques or normal crime.  






Modification Attacks on Information Systems
Shannon   and  Weaver’s   information   system  model   comprises   information   source,   transmitter,   receiver   and 







A   distributed   information   system   comprises   nodes   containing   components;   components   include   people, 











However,   collocation   increases   defence   efficiency  with   unimpeded   access   and   concentration   of   resources. 
Further, replacement systems may be readily available.
One possible IW attack on system hardware is the use of substandard components during the construction, repair 
and   upgrade   phases   of   a   project.       The   crime   of   counterfeiting   high­value   components   is   widespread 
(Chesterman   and  Lipman,   1988)   and  may   include   the   use   of   substandard  materials   to  maximise   profits. 




A Notional Modification Attack on a Collocated Distributed System 
Given that distribution logistically complicates a system wide attack and collocation simplifies the attack but 
increases defender’s effectiveness, a surreptitious attack may be considered.      In an IW context, a system attack 
through substandard components  may create disruption or  damage but  may be detected by existing Quality 






























































there are Australian standards relating to record management practices. (AS15489, 2002)       Further, electronic 
records are now readily admissible in support of legal argument.  These records must be maintained in suitable 
manner to permit such use.
















intellectual   property.      A   nation   dependent   on   electronics  may   need   to  maintain   a   complete   design   and 
fabrication capability to ensure that hardware attacks are not effective. 
This   raises   concern  over   ‘Trusted’  manufactures  where  products   are   commonly  obtained   from commercial 
sources,   often  based  overseas.    Local  manufacture  of  desired   items  may breach  commercial   licensing  and 
intellectual property rights.        While reparations may be made after the fact,  obtaining the information and 











with effects ranging from almost undetectable to catastrophic.      Improved security in storage,  transport  and 
packaging can limit the opportunities to introduce modifications.  However, costs of ensuring component quality 
may become a substantial problem.   
Ensuring  component  supply  for  critical   systems may  require major   investment   in   resources,  diplomacy and 
business negotiations.   ‘Trusted’ manufacture to ensure continued supply of mission critical components may be 
very costly if intellectual property, technology transfer and political considerations are included.     These costs 
must be considered in the design and implementation of any critical system.
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